Abstract

This paper seeks to check the existence of possible nonlinearity in the behavior of the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT) in response to changes in macroeconomic variables over 2000:1-2018:12 period (pre-and post-2011 revolution). We used a general model with asymmetric loss function, which enables Central Bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation and output from their reference values, as well as a nonlinear economic structure. The empirical analysis reveals that in the pre-revolutionary period, the CBT, for the sake of financial stability approved asymmetric preferences only toward the inflation rate in the sense that it reduces interest rate by a larger amount when inflation is expected to be below the target than the amount it will increase it when it is expected to be above target. During the post-revolutionary period, which was marked by a severe economic recession, the CBT also showed asymmetric preferences toward the output stabilization as it reacted more vigorously to recession. Nevertheless, for a sufficiently large inflation pressure strengthened by the nonlinear economic structure, the CBT is obliged to enhance sharply the political instrument and to carry out a strict restrictive monetary policy.

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