Abstract
Abstract This chapter characterizes nonideal social ontology, including a special branch of nonideal social ontology called emancipatory social ontology, by showing what influential accounts of nonideal social ontology have in common and how these features differ from the standard model of ideal social ontology. Ásta’s conferralism, Johan Brännmark’s theory of nonideal institutions, Sally Haslanger’s analyses of gender and race, and Katharine Jenkins’ work on ontic oppression are discussed as examples of nonideal social ontology. More specifically, it is argued that nonideal social ontology can overcome some of the major limitations of ideal social ontology, such as an overemphasis of collective intentionality and too little attention to oppression. More generally, characterizing nonideal social ontology is vital for understanding the paradigm shift from ideal to nonideal social ontology that is currently underway in contemporary social ontology.
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