Nonideal Justice as Nonideal Fairness

Abstract

This paper provides foundations for the first comprehensive nonideal theory of justice. §1 of this paper argues that whichever ideal theory turns out to be correct – whether ideal justice is fairness, libertarian, pluralist, contextualist, communitarian; etc. – nonideal justice is nonideal fairness. Specifically, §1 shows that literallyevery debate within nonideal theory – debates about war, affirmative action, etc. – is fundamentally a debate about what is fair under unjust conditions. The question then is what “nonideal fairness” is. In order to answer this question, §2 of this paper constructs a new theoretical apparatus: a moral model that (I argue) any ideal theorist can accept, whatever their doctrinal leanings, as a model of nonideal fairness. The model I construct is broadly based upon John Rawls’ “original position.” It is crucial to emphasize “broadly.” I prefer to call the model I construct the “nondenominational NNOP” (or NNOP) because, as we will see, the model can incorporate any ideal theory – for example, libertarian ideals, pluralist ideals, communitarian ideals; etc. – into its very structure, modeling nonideal fairness relative to that theory of ideals. §3 then shows that the parties to the NNOP should aim to obtain several “nonideal primary goods.” Finally, §4 argues that the NNOP generates a General Principle of Nonideal Theory, and five lexically ordered corollary principles, that together comprise a compelling comprehensive nonideal theory of justice – a theory that can be usefully extended to any area of nonideal theory, including the justice of war, affirmative action, etc.