NONEXISTENTS THEN AND NOW

Abstract

I PROBLEM: THE BEING OF NONEXISTENTS. In matters of irreality, medieval philosophers were not much concerned with fiction as such. The prime focus of their attention was theology, and their dealings with nonexistence related to the role of such items in relation to the thoughts of God rather than those of man. In this light, the medievals approached the issue of nonexistents on essentially the following basis: God created the world about us. His choice to create this world was a free choice--had he wanted to do so, he could have created the world differently. The things that would have existed had he done this are of course nonexistent. And on this basis room must be made for such beings as a deliberative possibility because in order to make a rational choice God had to make comparisons. To assure the freedom of God's creative choice there have to be other possibilities, and to implement the idea of other possibilities it is necessary to postulate other possibles, that is, mere possibilia. As the medievals saw it, in order to create his world in a manner that is wise and good, God had to compare his actual creation choices with their (inferior) alternatives. And so he therefore must, by way of contrast, contemplate nonexistence and nonexistents. But nonexistents are--so it would seem--in principle unknowable. The difficulty that arises here was contemplated by Moses Maimonides whose position in this regard was summarized by Harry Austryn Wolfson as follows: Knowledge of non-existent things ... was objectionable to the medievals on two main grounds. First, it was not true knowledge, if by truth is meant correspondence of the idea in the mind to an object outside the mind. Second, in the event the non-existent object became existent, it would imply a change of the knower. (1) Given such problems, it should occasion no surprise that St. Thomas Aquinas grappled at some length with the issue of nonexistent possibles in the context of the question of God's knowledge of things that are not. A synopsis of Thomas's general position is clearly conveyed in the following passage: The relation of the divine knowledge to other things, therefore, will be such that it can be even of non-existing things.... Now, the artisan knows through his art even those things that have not yet been fashioned, since the forms of his art flow from his knowledge to external matter for the constitution of the artifacts. Hence, nothing forbids that there be in the knowledge of an artisan forms that have not yet come out of it. Thus, nothing forbids God to have knowledge of the things that are not.... Moreover, by that operation through which it knows what a thing is, even our intellect can know those things that do not actually exist. It can comprehend the essence of a lion or a horse even though all such animals were to be destroyed. But the divine intellect knows, in the manner of one knowing what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciables as is clear from what we have said. Therefore, it can know even the things that are not.... But not all non-beings have the same relation to His knowledge. For those things that are not, nor will be, nor ever were, are known by God as possible to His power. Hence, God does not know them as in some way existing in themselves, but as existing only in the divine power. (2) Thus Thomas's position is that God has full knowledge of nonexistents since they correspond to concepts in his intellect, which comprehends all enunciables. Indeed, God must be able to grasp these for several reasons: (1) because he otherwise would not be omniscient, (2) because his omnibenevolence requires comparative preferences, and (3) because his omnipotence would otherwise be impeded as well, since the full exercise of any power (including creative power) requires knowledge of the range of alternatives lying within one's power. …