Abstract
Considering the diversified requirements of modern manufacturing, the paper studies a group of scheduling problems where jobs and machine have independent performance objectives. Based on noncooperative game, it is modeled as a two-layer optimization problem. In job-layer, the jobs' strategies resulted from competition for machine resource achieve Nash Equilibrium (NE), while in machine-layer, machine induces the NE to some global optimum by indirectly influencing jobs' selfish behaviors. Referring to Lagrangian relaxation, an iterative algorithm is developed to solve the problem. Numerical example is also given for illustration.
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