Abstract
Evolutionary game theory and public goods games offer an important framework to understand cooperation during pandemics. From this perspective, the COVID-19 situation can be conceptualized as a dilemma where people who neglect safety precautions act as free riders, because they get to enjoy the benefits of decreased health risk from others’ compliance with policies despite not contributing to or even undermining public safety themselves. At the same time, humans appear to carry a suite of evolved psychological mechanisms aimed at curbing free riding in order to ensure the continued provision of public goods, which can be leveraged to develop more effective measures to promote compliance with regulations. We also highlight factors beyond free riding that reduce compliance rates, such as the emergence of conspiratorial thinking, which seriously undermine the effectiveness of measures to suppress free riding. Together, the current paper outlines the social dynamics that occur in public goods dilemmas involving the spread of infectious disease, highlights the utility and limits of evolutionary game-theoretic approaches for COVID-19 management, and suggests novel directions based on emerging challenges to cooperation.
Highlights
The numerous articles on COVID-19 to date represent an impressive effort to come to terms with, inform about, and manage the crisis
The current paper aims to introduce the broader ideas of evolutionary game theory (EGT), describe free-riding behavior in the context of COVID-19, and outline possible mechanisms that may inhibit them
Further discussions on the complexities of applying EGT to design effective interventions in the COVID-19 context are warranted as these are complex, iterative games that are concurrently happening in different ways around the world
Summary
The numerous articles on COVID-19 to date represent an impressive effort to come to terms with, inform about, and manage the crisis. Considering these limitations, Cato et al (2020) recommended the use of (1) voluntary- or nudge-based approaches as they carry low economic costs while preserving civil liberties and (2) moderate legal sanctions to address more serious cases of noncompliant behavior, but with some caveats: preferably when altruistic or other-regarding concerns are a feature of prevailing norms As simple penalties such as fines can result in individuals feeling morally licensed to commit violations insofar as they pay the fee (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Bowles and Polanía-Reyes, 2012), it is important that citizens care enough about how they are judged for reneging on social obligations for such punishments to have a desired effect. Holistic COVID-19 management would involve an appreciation of the many factors that calibrate payoffs so that both individual and governmental decisions shift toward safety
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