Abstract
The article is focused on research of an attack on the quantum key distribution system and proposes a countermeasure method. Particularly noteworthy is that this is not a classic attack on a quantum protocol. We describe an attack on the process of calibration. Results of the research show that quantum key distribution systems have vulnerabilities not only in the protocols, but also in other vital system components. The described type of attack does not affect the cryptographic strength of the received keys and does not point to the vulnerability of the quantum key distribution protocol. We also propose a method for autocompensating optical communication system development, which protects synchronization from unauthorized access. The proposed method is based on the use of sync pulses attenuated to a photon level in the process of detecting a time interval with a signal. The paper presents the results of experimental studies that show the discrepancies between the theoretical and real parameters of the system. The obtained data allow the length of the quantum channel to be calculated with high accuracy.
Highlights
Results of research show that an attack on the quantum key distribution system (QKDS) synchronization system can Results of research show that attack to on counter the QKDS
We are disrupting the quantum channel, but we are not interfering with the quantum protocol
Is a simple example: if an attacker damages the optical cable, the system will detect it; if we use our method, the system does not detect an intruder in the quantum channel
Summary
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Clavis ; we do not examine the security of the quantum BB84 protocol and do not claim that our attack is an attack on the BB84 protocol; and we do not test the strength of quantum keys and do not claim that the described attack affects the strength of the keys These are important notes for understanding the aims of the paper. QKDS have many loopholes for an attacker This is not about quantum cryptography protocols that are reasonably secure. Single-photon avalanche diodes were used as optical radiation detecting devices The operation of such systems is impossible without the process of station coordination, i.e., synchronization of the transmitter and receiver separated in space. In the QKDS, synchronization consists of a high-precision determination of the length of the optical pulse propagation path and is based on the registration of the moment when the synchronizing pulse is received by photodetectors
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