Non-inferential knowledge

Abstract

The notion of non-inferential knowledge has figured prominently in epistemology for some time. Some philosophers, especially those who accept some foundational account of epistemic justification, have argued that there surely is some non-inferential knowledge, indeed that there must be, since there surely is plenty of inferential knowledge. And, even among those who eschew all forms of foundationalist positions, there are those who claim that some propositions are non-inferentially known.1 There have also been disputes as to which propositions, or kinds of empirical propositions, ff any, are non-inferentiaUy knowable. Some philosophers maintain that only some phenomenal propositions are thus knowable; others claim that in addition to these we can allow that some propositions concerned with one's present mental states other than phenomenal states are non-inferentially knowable; and, still others reckon some propositons about the external world and about other minds and the past as non-inferentially knowable, if not non-inferentially known. 2 Parties to these disputes generally agree that some empirical propositions are non-inferentially known, or at least non-inferentially knowable. Still, the concept of non-inferential knowledge is suspect, and it is widely supposed that it is vacuous. The reasons for this suspicion are many and varied; but, I think the primary reason is that the concept of non-inferential knowledge is assumed to be closely connected to several other epistemic concepts and each of these concepts, it is supposed, is at best suspect. Non-inferential knowledge is closely associated with foundationalisms in epistemology, with traditional notions of incorrigibility, certainty and the like, and with one or more versions of "the given." Foundationalism is generally construed as mistaken; incorrigibility and certainty (as well as allied concepts such as that of indubitability) are typically taken as empty; and all forms of "the given" are alleged to be, in Sollars' phrase, myths. Hence, non-inferential knowledge sins by association.