Abstract
Public policies are reflected in the public domain more by how laws are implemented on the ground than by what their legislative content is. The departures from legislative intent are often scripted by the non-legislative actors at the cutting edge level in public organizations and people outside of the reference frame are often at their wits’ end as to why such departures take place at all. This essay takes up two Indian laws—one provincial and the other federal—and relying upon Michael Lipsky’s theory of street level bureaucracy, seeks to explore why two critical provisions thereof remained mostly unimplemented right since their legislation. Why do the street level bureaucrats mostly intend to depart from the avowed intent? Do they really stand to gain in such a scenario of non-implementation? If so, how? These questions are discussed in an expanded way in regard to the Bengal Excise Act, 1909 and the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
Highlights
Public policies are reflected in the public domain more by how laws are implemented on the ground than by what their legislative content is
Why do the so-called street level bureaucrats act in the way they act? Do they purposely seek to frustrate the legislative intent? Or do they do it compulsively? If so, what can be the factors behind such behavior? Let us try to understand how Lipsky seeks to theorize the service delivery behavior of such street level bureaucrats and along what lines
The Bengal Excise Act is a special law and like in many other special laws, there is a distinct difference in terms of post detection procedure
Summary
Laws are enacted in order that certain policy objectives can be achieved in the public domain. Michael Lipsky broadly categorizes police officers and other law enforcement officials, judges in the courts of first instance and public lawyers among certain other officials in one expanded bracket and calls them street level bureaucrats and tentatively identifies them as a group in terms of multiple behavioral characteristics. As a group, they are characterized by (i) regular and direct interaction with citizens, or the recipients of government services and (ii) the power to exercise a degree of discretion over the services, benefits and sanctions received by those recipients. Why do the so-called street level bureaucrats act in the way they act? Do they purposely seek to frustrate the legislative intent? Or do they do it compulsively? If so, what can be the factors behind such behavior? Let us try to understand how Lipsky seeks to theorize the service delivery behavior of such street level bureaucrats and along what lines
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Law and Public Administration
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
