Non-domination, non-normativity and neo-republican politics

Abstract

A recent point of debate as regards Philip Pettit’s neo-republicanism has been whether freedom as non-domination, and the notion of arbitrariness accordingly, should be seen as non-normative. In this article, I argue that, due to neglect of the political implications of neo-republican theory, participants in this debate have failed to realize that Pettit relies on two distinct accounts of arbitrariness in line with his distinction between private and public domination. Discussing recent attempts at refining our understanding of arbitrariness and the distinction between normative and non-normative concepts, I suggest that freedom from public domination may indeed be characterized as non-normative, namely insofar as it represents a practice-based concept. I conclude with an observation about some further implications of understanding freedom as a practice-based concept and the way Pettit himself deals with them.