Abstract
Theories where truth is a naive concept fall under the following dilemma: either the theory is subject to Curry's Paradox, which engenders triviality, or the theory is not trivial but the resulting conditional is too weak. In this paper we explore a number of theories which arguably do not fall under this dilemma. In these theories the conditional is characterized in terms of (infinitely-valued) non-deterministic matrices. These non-deterministic theories are similar to infinitely-valued ?ukasiewicz logic in that they are consistent and their conditionals are quite strong. The difference is the following: while ?ukasiewicz logic is $${\omega}$$?-inconsistent, the non-deterministic theories might turn out to be $${\omega}$$?-consistent.
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