Non-cooperative code design in radar networks: a game-theoretic approach

Marco Piezzo,Antonio De Maio,Alfonso Farina,Stefano Buzzi,Augusto Aubry

doi:10.1186/1687-6180-2013-63

Abstract

A network of radars sharing the same frequency band, and using properly coded waveforms to improve features attractive from the radar point of view is considered in this article. Non-cooperative games aimed at code design for maximization of the signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of each active radar are presented. Code update strategies are proposed, and, resorting to the theory of potential games, the existence of Nash equilibria is analytically proven. In particular, we propose non-cooperative code update procedures for the cases in which a matched filter, a minimum integrated sidelobe level filter, and a minimum peak to sidelobe level filter are used at the receiver. The case in which the received data contain a non-negligible Doppler shift is also analyzed. Experimental results confirm that the proposed procedures reach an equilibrium in few iterations, as well as that the SINR values at the equilibrium are largely superior to those in the case in which classical waveforms are used and no optimization of the radar code is performed.

Highlights

In the last decade, the importance of radar has grown progressively with the increasing dimension of the system: from a single colocated antenna to large sensor networks [1,2]
The concept of heterogeneous radars working together has thoroughly been studied, opening the door to the ideas of multiple-input multiple-output radar [3,4], over-the-horizon radar networks [5], and distributed aperture radar [6,7]. These three scenarios are the examples of cooperative radar networks, in the sense that every single sensor contributes to the overall detection process
5 Conclusion In this article, we have considered a network of radars sharing the same frequency band, and tuning their transmitted waveforms in order to improve their signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR)

Summary

Introduction

The importance of radar has grown progressively with the increasing dimension of the system: from a single colocated antenna to large sensor networks [1,2]. The sensors are just added to the already existing network (plug and fight), and each sensor exhibits its own detection scheme This is the case of non-cooperative radar networks [8,9]; in this scenario, it is extremely important that each additional sensor interferes as little as possible with the pre-existing elements, and, to. We design utility functions, based on the framework of potential games [23], trying to improve the SINR of the active radars through a non-cooperative game. A quick reading of this definition might lead to think that at NE users’ utilities achieve their maximum values This is not the case, since the existence of an NE point does not imply that no other strategy K-tuple exists that can lead to an improvement of the utilities of some players while not decreasing the utilities of the remaining ones. That have been used in recent years to obtain resource allocation schemes in wireless communication applications (see, e.g., [25] and references therein), will be used here in a radar scenario to come up with procedures convergent to an NE

Problem formulation and code updating procedure

Conclusion