Abstract
AbstractWe consider a polluting Cournot duopoly within a managerial delegation framework and examine conflicting environmental concerns in which the owners pursue strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) while the managers undertake diverged environmental research and development (ER&D) investment. We investigate the effects of cooperation in both ECSR and ER&D on a firm's profitability and social welfare and find that managerial coordination has a critical effect on industry emissions, profits, and welfare. In the context of an optimal emissions tax, we show that managerial coordination failure might not occur, but it reduces welfare if the environmental damage is relatively high. We conclude that a pro‐environmental government should encourage cooperative ER&D, especially when owners adopt cooperative ECSR.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
