Abstract
AbstractThis paper examines the determination of non‐controlling large shareholders (NCLSs) on firm performance and investigates the impacts of NCLSs on tunneling and investment efficiency. We use three attributes of NCLSs (ownership, identity, and relational board/management representation) to fully capture the governance effects of NCLSs. We find robust evidence that NCLSs are associated with higher firm performance. Furthermore, we also document that NCLSs promote investment efficiency. However, except for individual investors, the other items in NCLSs deteriorate tunneling. Additionally, except for mutual funds, we find that the other governance effects of NCLSs are stable under different circumstances.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
