Non-Cognitivist Rebuttal

Abstract

1. “Facts.” Jaffa holds value non-cognitivism (NC) to imply both “complete credulity concerning ‘facts’” and “total skepticism” about facts. One and the same epistemological theory can hardly be akin to naive realism as well as to skepticism. NC implies neither. As an outgrowth of modern empiricism, NC considers concepts such as “man,” “chair,” “atom” as constructs, and statements such as “man is a political animal,” “this is a chair” as hypotheses. Empirical hypotheses are scientifically meaningful if they can be tested, however indirectly, by observational data. Most of Jaffa's comments fail to meet this criterion of meaningfulness because they contain words such as “reality,” “order of the soul,” “man's humanity,” “Justice,” which cannot be operationally defined. “The objectivity of the external world cannot be demonstrated,” Jaffa concedes. Then why talk about it? Physicists never “debate the nature of the universe” and never ask “whether it has objective existence.” Physicists establish empirical laws in order to explain past and predict future events (not “reality”). Political scientists do the same—unless they turn metaphysicians.