Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality

Abstract

We study new non-Bayesian solutions of games in strategic form, based on four notions of dominance: weak or strict domination by either a pure or a mixed strategy. For each of these types of dominance, d, we define a family of sets of strategy profiles, called d-correlated equilibria. We study the structure and properties of these families. A player is d-dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows about the play of the other players. A set of profiles is a d-correlated equilibrium if and only if it is the set of profiles played in a model where d-dominance rationality is commonly known. When d denotes strict domination by a mixed strategy, a set of profiles is a d-correlated equilibrium if and only if it is the set of profiles played in a model where Bayesian rationality is commonly known.