Abstract
By means that meet the standards of nominalism set by Nelson Goodman (in [1], section II, 3; and in [2]) we can define relations that behave in many ways like the membership relation of set theory. Though the agreement is imperfect, these pseudo-membership relations seem much closer to membership than to its usual nominalistic counterpart, the part-whole relation. Someone impressed by the diversity of set theories might regard the theories of these relations as peculiar set theories; someone more impressed by the non-diversity of the more successful set theories-ZF and its relatives-might prefer not to. This verbal dispute does not matter; what matters is that the gap between nominalistic and set-theoretic methods of construction is narrower than it seems.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
