Nomina Actionis in the diachrony of Italian: a paradigm-based model of competition

Integrated budget-holding (fundholding) based on risk-adjusted capitation is commonly proposed as a central element of health system reform. Two contrasting models have been developed: the competitive model where fundholders or health plans compete for enrollees; and the non-competitive model, where plan membership is determined according to an objective attribute such as place of residence. Under the competitive model, efficiency is sought through consumer choice of plan. A range of regulatory elements may also be introduced to moderate undesirable elements of competition. Under the non-competitive model, efficiency is achieved through government regulation and the fact that the fundholder has continuing responsibility for the health of a defined population, supported by micro-management tools (such as quality assurance and selective payment arrangements). In theory, the non-competitive model encourages population-based health services planning. While both models assume risk-adjusted capitated funding, the requirements of any formula are more stringent under the competitive model. Economic theory, as well as documented health system experience, can help identify the relative strengths and limitations of each model. Concerns with the competitive model relate primarily to the capacity to develop robust risk adjusters for capitation sufficient to reduce the incentives for patient risk selection. Possible reductions in the quality of care are also a concern, compounded by difficulties for consumers in discriminating between plans. Efficiency under the non-competitive model requires a strong and appropriate regulatory/policy framework and effective use of micro-management tools. Funding equity objectives can be met through either model by the adoption of income-related contributions, but under the competitive model this may be compromised by incentives for the fundholders to select low-risk patients. Evidence drawn from regional fundholding in New South Wales (NSW, Australia), the US Veterans Health Agency and the literature on managed care in the USA illustrate these concerns. The problem of risk selection in the competitive model is a major theoretical concern, confirmed by the empirical evidence. This, together with concerns regarding other aspects of performance, suggests that the non-competitive model may be preferable, at least as an interim step in reform in public or mixed systems. Future research on this issue is clearly required.

Using previously published data, several models were constructed to predict the distribution of Anolis lizard species on a set of sites on Puerto Rico and Jamaica. The models form a series with increasing ecological detail. The simpler "null" models are based on randomly created species-site matrices using progressively greater dependency on the observed matrix. The remaining models hypothesize that competition is the most important biotic interaction determining the intra-island distribution of the lizards. "Simple" competition models test the predictive power of simple statistical descriptions relating intensity of competition and ecological variables such as niche overlap and body size ratios. More complicated models are based on the ecomorph model of Williams (1972) and use the lizard resourceuse data of several niche dimensions (e.g., perch diameter and height). These models are derived from Puerto Rican data and tested against Jamaican data. The primary statistical tool used to test the accuracy of these models in the kappa statistic (Fleiss 1973) which assesses the degree of agreement in a contingency table relative to that expected by chance. The model structure is based on generative grammars (Haefner 1981), but is also related to artificial intelligence expert systems. Model comparisons indicate the following. (1) Only those null models constrained by the marginals of the observed species-site matrix agree with observed data. (2) Simple competition models based on fixed size ratios and/or fixed levels of allowable overlap do not agree well. (3) A complex competition model developed for Puerto Rico also shows significant agreement with lizard distributions on Jamaica, but is not better than a constrained null model. (4) If allowance is made for the restricted distribution of A. sagrei, a recent colonist of Jamaica, agreement of the competition model increases dramatically. It is predicted that A. sagrei would persist following an experimental transplant to eastern Jamaica.

Since Schumpeter, it has been assumed that innovation typically plays a key role in competitiveness at firm, industry and national levels. This assumption has been applied to firms both in developed and developing countries. However, the innovative capacity and business environments of firms in developing countries are different from these of firms in developed countries. It stands to reason that innovation and competitiveness models based on developed countries may not well be applicable to developing countries. Drawing on theoretical bases of competitiveness, technology, and innovation, the current research adds to the literature in three respects. First, it introduces a more systematic innovation-led competitiveness model in which higher productivity is achieved through higher efficiency in the global knowledge economy; second, it presents an empirical analysis of driving forces of innovation and competitiveness; third, it identifies the impacts of intellectual property rights protection. The innovation-led competitive advantage model extends Porter’s Competitiveness Diamond, in which a firm’s capacity in identifying, negotiating, networking with and improving its existing technological capacity is at the core of competitiveness.

This study examines a competition model featuring nonuniform dispersal, referred to as starvation-driven-type diffusion (SDTD). This model incorporates the motility of species that adhere to a starvation-driven diffusion (SDTD). paradigm while also factoring in perceptual constraints within a spatially heterogeneous region. In the proposed model, our study aims to understand the impact of SDTD on system dynamics in a spatially heterogeneous environment. To achieve this, we consider a Lotka-Volterra-type competition model exhibiting identical population dynamics under no-flux boundary conditions. To illuminate the evolutionary implications of SDTD, this study contrasts two different models. The first model involves two species with distinct, uniform diffusion rates. In comparison, the second model features one species that adheres to a constant diffusion rate and another that operates under the principles of SDTD. This study focuses on analyzing the fitness variation of competing species based on their respective diffusion dynamics: (i) The study examines how the fitness of a species following SDTD changes compared to another species that diffuses at a constant rate. (ii) We investigate the dynamics of fitness alteration within a competitive two-species model wherein one species exhibits a constant diffusion rate while the other species alternates between constant-rate diffusion and SDTD. In addition, we examine how the shifting diffusion strategies of one species affect its fitness relative to a species with a fixed, constant diffusion rate. Our conclusions suggest that a species adhering to SDTD may enhance its fitness, consistent with the model incorporating SDD. Nonetheless, we show that certain circumstances may exist where SDTD does not result in increased fitness for a species, mainly due to the perceptual limitations of that species.

Validation of competition and dynamic models for Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC) growth in raw ground pork during temperature abuse

This paper examines market models with supply friction. We examine a competitive equilibrium model, and a monopolistic model in which a single firm determines the market price. The following conclusions are obtained: (i) If friction is present, no matter how small, then the market prices fluctuate between zero and the “choke-up” price, without any tendency to converge to the marginal production cost, exhibiting considerable volatility. This conclusion holds for both the competitive equilibrium market model, and the monopolistic market model. (ii) The long-run average price in the competitive model is always greater than the marginal cost, but less than the long-run average cost in the monopolistic model. (iii) In the competitive model the consumer obtains social surplus, while in the monopolistic model the supplier extracts the entire surplus from the market.

The ability of four mechanistic population models to mirror a 5‐year time series of seasonal densities of the pampas mouse, Akodon azarae, from central Argentina, is evaluated in this paper. The different models included, singly or in combination, the effects of a putative competitor and a specialist predator on the dynamics of pampas mice. The most simple model, a logistic single‐species stochastic differential equation, failed to fit the observed time series satisfactorily (Rmodel2 = 0.36), while models including interspecific effects gave much better fits with increasing model complexity (competition Rmodel2 = 0.71, predation Rmodel2 = 0.62, competition and predation Rmodel2 = 0.83). Using Akaike's information criterion, the competition model was selected as the best alternative with regard to model fit and model complexity. Synthetic time‐series probes obtained by simulations from the parameterized stochastic mechanistic models were significantly different and indicated the competition plus predation model as a slightly better alternative than the competition model. The differences between the two methods for selecting models indicate that the incorporation of predation only slightly improves the match between the predicted and observed time series and that this slight improvement is not sufficient to override the increase in model complexity. Competition thus seems to play a more important role than predation in shaping the population dynamics of pampas mice.

Because China’s economic structure is different from that in OECD countries, using conventional neo-classical competitive trade models to analyze the welfare and trade impacts of trade related policy change can be misleading. In particular, both the exchange rate regime and output and pricing policies of state owned enterprises (SOE’s) will have effects on trade and welfare which differ from a classical competitive model. This paper present a numerical model that captures the combined and interactive effects of three policy elements in prototype form of tariffs, policy towards SOEs in the industrial sector, and an exchange rate regime supporting large trade surpluses and additions to foreign reserves. The model has non neutral monetary features, endogenous trade imbalances and average product pricing of labor in goods. We do not claim it to be fully representative of modern China, but it does go some way beyond simple competitive models used elsewhere and points to different conclusions of policy impact. We calibrate our model to 2006 data, and then evaluate the impacts both singly and in combination of: tariff liberalization, a move to more freely floating exchange rates, and SOE enterprise reform. Results show that large differences in policy have a different impact relative to a classical competitive model. SOE reform and a freely floating Chinese exchange rate have more impact on China’s welfare than tariff liberalization. Policies of RMB appreciation and increasing China’s money stock reduce China’s trade surplus. In the traditional competitive model, trade liberalization impacts both imports and exports, while in our central case model, with endogenously determined trade surplus, trade liberalization has little effect on exports. Most of the policy impact is on imports and the trade surplus. SOE reform of China’s manufacturing sector significantly decreases production of China’s manufacturing sector and increases production in China’s other sectors.

Estimates of species' vital rates and an understanding of the factors affecting those parameters over time and space can provide crucial information for management and conservation. We used mark–recapture, reproductive output, and territory occupancy data collected during 1985–2013 to evaluate population processes of Northern Spotted Owls (Strix occidentalis caurina) in 11 study areas in Washington, Oregon, and northern California, USA. We estimated apparent survival, fecundity, recruitment, rate of population change, and local extinction and colonization rates, and investigated relationships between these parameters and the amount of suitable habitat, local and regional variation in meteorological conditions, and competition with Barred Owls (Strix varia). Data were analyzed for each area separately and in a meta-analysis of all areas combined, following a strict protocol for data collection, preparation, and analysis. We used mixed effects linear models for analyses of fecundity, Cormack-Jolly-...

Chapter 41 Comparative Advantage and International Trade

The behavior of individuals and groups in the political realm is subject to many and varied incentives. These incentives impact significantly not only the candidates who win elections, but also the policies that they implement. This thesis analyzes several aspects of this problem that have until now gone unexplained. Part 1 contains two models of candidate competition. Chapter 1 details a model of competition under the plurality rule that simultaneously explains two well-documented empirical regularities: that typically only two parties compete in each election (Duverger's Law), and that these parties choose non-centrist policy platforms. I show that if, and only if, competition is for multiple districts does an equilibrium consistent with these phenomena exist. I characterize bounds on district heterogeneity for this to be true, which can be interpreted as describing the domain for Duverger's Law. In Chapter 2, I turn attention to the run-off rule and study a similar model to that of Chapter 1. I find that this subtle change to the counting rule has a significant impact on the incentives and equilibria of the model. In the traditional single district environment there now exists a continuum of two-party non-centrist equilibria, which are robust to simultaneous competition for multiple districts. In Part 2, I investigate the behavior of voters, and particularly the effect of vote timing on voter behavior and election outcomes. In Chapter 3, I study a model of sequential voting and explain when and why the commonly observed phenomena of bandwagons and momentum arise. I show that only if voters have a desire to vote for the winning candidate, in addition to their desire to select the better candidate, is momentum observed and bandwagons begun. In Chapter 4, I compare these results with analogous results for when voting is simultaneous and characterize when each process is superior. The conclusions confirm commonly held views about the front-loading of U.S. presidential primaries: that in tight races a simultaneous vote is preferred, but in lopsided races a sequential vote is better. Strangely, the superior performance of sequential voting in lopsided races is precisely because bandwagons occur.

In regional studies, place-based and endogenous regional development and regional competitiveness became a major focus accompanied by an emphasis on the local application of research and development. On a similar note, one of the most important means of the renewed EU cohesion policy is the institutional decentralization of research and development and the strengthened support of scientific activities, also acting as the central focus, for instance, for the regional innovation strategies for smart specialization (RIS3). In our study, first, we look at the definition of regional competitiveness and the related interpretation frames. Next, we focus on models of competitiveness and propose a renewed pyramid model of regional competitiveness as a synthesis of the endogenous regional growth approach and development theories. Afterward, we proceed to the competitiveness analysis of 93 NUTS 3 level regions of 4 East-Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) conducted by principal component analysis methods based on statistical data tables. We studied the spatial connection between research and development and county competitiveness along our renewed pyramid model. In all the four countries, we handled capital cities together with their neighboring counties as common standalone entities, and we also combined seven metropolitan counties in Poland. Echoing the widespread, relative definition of regional competitiveness, we mostly compared counties with each other. Based on our results, we differentiated four county competitiveness types. In determining the main competitiveness types of the Central and Eastern European regions we extensively drew upon the findings of Gyula Horvath, who carried out significant work in this field.

From a panel data sample of 898 hotel mergers, we find that mergers increase occupancy without reducing capacity. In some regressions, price also appears to increase. These effects are small, but statistically and economically significant. And they occur only in markets with the highest capacity utilization and highest uncertainty. These findings lead us to reject simple models of price or quantity competition in favor of models of ―revenue management,‖ where firms price to fill available capacity in the face of demand uncertainty. The results suggest that mergers in revenue-management industries should not be analyzed using models of competition that miss significant industry features. The same warning applies to the scrutiny of information sharing by proximate businesses—if outright merger does not appear to have anticompetitive effects then neither should information sharing, again provided that the significant features of the industry are taken into account.

The aim of this paper is to theoretically establish the application of Cournot’s model of competition as the reduced form of two-stage competition in oligopoly markets, in the circumstances with limited capacities. In this manner, a valuable tool is provided to the competition protection authority for analysing the unilateral effects of the horizontal mergers. The outcome of the two-stage competition, where firms chose to have a certain level of capacity, before the price competition, coincides with the outcome of the Cournot quantity competition model. Moreover, it turns out that this result is valid both for the homogeneous products markets and for the markets with differentiated products. This contradicts a standard attitude that quantity is a strategic variable exclusively within the homogeneous product markets. While controlling horizontal mergers, the competition authority often relies on traditional analysis elements, which start with the definition of the relevant market and market shares, and the concentration measures based on that definition. Analyses of this kind are carried out almost in a standard manner, for both markets with homogeneous and differentiated products. It is easy to verify that every analysis of this type encompasses the mentioned model of quantity competition in its foundation. Therefore, the discussion that is presented attempts to eliminate doubts related to the role of the Cournot model in merger control policy.

Oligopoly is a basic concept in the theory of competition. This structure is the central object of research in the economics of markets. There are many mathematical models of the market that are formalized in the form of an oligopoly in economic theory. The Cournot oligopoly is an elementary mathematical model of competition. The principle of equilibrium formalizes the non-cooperative nature of the conflict. Each player chooses the equilibrium strategy of behavior that provides the greatest profit, provided that the other competitors adhere to their equilibrium strategies. The Stackelberg model describes a two-level hierarchical model of firm competition. The top-level player (center, leader) chooses his strategy, assuming reasonable (optimal) decision-making by the lower-level players. Lower-level players (agents, followers) recognize the leadership of the center. They consider the center's strategies known. These players choose their strategies, wanting to maximize their payoff functions. This hierarchical structure is from a game point of view a case of a hierarchical game Gamma1. The indefinite uncontrolled factors (uncertainties) are the values for which only the range of possible values is known in this paper. Recently, studies of game models under uncertainty have been actively conducted. In particular, non-coalitional games under uncertainty are investigated. The concepts of risk and regret are formalized in various ways in the theory of problems with uncertainty. At the same time, the decision-maker takes into account both the expected losses and the possibility of favorable actions of factors beyond his control.\nThis article examines the two-level hierarchical structure of decision-making in the problem of firm competition. A linear-quadratic model with two levels of hierarchy is considered. This model uses the concepts of Cournot and Stackelberg under uncertainty. Uncontrolled factors (uncertainties) are identified with the actions of the importing company. The Wald and Savage principles are used to formalize the solution. According to Wald's maximin criterion, game with nature is seen as a conflict with a player who wants to harm the decision-maker as much as possible.\n\nSavage's minimax regret criterion, when choosing the optimal strategy, focuses not on winning, but on regret. As an optimal strategy, the strategy is chosen in which the amount of regret in the worst conditions is minimal. A new approach to decision-making in the game with nature is formalized. It allows you to combine the positive features of both principles and weaken their negative properties. The concept of U-optimal solution of the problem in terms of risks and regrets is considered.\nThe problems of formalization of some types of optimal solutions for a specific linear-quadratic problem with two levels of hierarchy are solved.