Abstract
Abstract This paper examines many-player many-action global games with multidimensional state parameters. It establishes that the notion of noise-independent selection introduced by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner [D. Frankel, S. Morris, A. Pauzner, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities, J. Econ. Theory 108 (2003) 1–44] for one-dimensional global games is robust when the setting is extended to the one proposed by Carlsson and Van Damme [H. Carlsson, E. Van Damme, Global games and Equilibrium selection, Econometrica 61 (1993) 989–1018]. More precisely, our main result states that if an action profile of some complete information game is noise-independently selected in one-dimensional global games, then it is also noise-independently selected in all multidimensional global games.
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