Abstract
Node location protection is critical to the wireless sensor networks (WSN), especially for unattended environment. However, due to most of the static deployment and the limitations in energy, storage, and communication capabilities of the sensors, WSNs are vulnerable to various location (and derivative) attacks. In this work, we study the node location privacy protection issue from both aspects of attacks and defenses. First, we present a new two-phase location attack for two important types of nodes (including base station and source node). It can locate a base station node within few amounts of local wireless transmission monitoring and then reversely trace the location of the source node. Different from existing methods, the proposed attack determines the node location based on the transmission direction, which can break through existing defenses. Then, to defend against such attacks, we design a pseudospiral-based routing protocol for WSN. We analyze the performance of parameters such as routing probability, maximum detectable angle, hop count, and number of loops based on PU SBRF, MoRF, and PLAUDIT methods. The theory analysis and confrontation experiment of attack and defense show that the proposed scheme can protect the location privacy of the target node with moderate communication and computation overhead.
Highlights
As an important part of the Internet of things [1], unattended wireless sensor networks (UnWSNs) have been widely used in a variety of civilian and military applications [2]
Once node location is leaked or captured by an attacker, it will result in a series of derivative attacks, such as sensitive data theft and military target intelligence collection. erefore, privacy protection of node location becomes the top priority of UnWSNs security
To cope with the data sampling attack, sensors generate and send pseudomessages to disturb the attackers on an irregular basis. It improves the ability of the source node location privacy resisted. e theory analysis and confrontation experiment of attack and defense show that the proposed scheme owns capable of protecting the location privacy of the target node with moderate communication and computation overhead. e contributions of the paper are summarized as follows: (1) We first study a new bidirectional node location attack (BDLA) scheme in UnWSNs, and we propose a pseudospiral-routing protocol based on the Archimedes curve to protect the location privacy of both source nodes and SINK nodes
Summary
As an important part of the Internet of things [1], unattended wireless sensor networks (UnWSNs) have been widely used in a variety of civilian and military applications (such as environmental monitoring, marine disaster warning, offshore oil, and gas exploration) [2]. (1) We first study a new bidirectional node location attack (BDLA) scheme in UnWSNs, and we propose a pseudospiral-routing protocol based on the Archimedes curve to protect the location privacy of both source nodes and SINK nodes (2) We construct a one-by-one mapping relationship between Vcell and SINK based on the Voronoi rule, aiming to minimize the communication overhead of sending information from a given source node to the nearest SINK (3) To respond to data sampling attacks, we design a strategy in which the sensors generate and send false messages to disturb the attacker from time to time, making our mechanism more efficient (4) our extensive experiments on a test bed demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of the scheme e rest of the paper is organized as follows.
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