“No One Treated it as a Crime”: An Empirical Study of Corruption Rationalization

Abstract

Rationalization of corruption relieves oneself from moral imperatives. It comes from the concept of moral disengagement, the cognitive misperception that some inhuman or immoral activity is not wrong, nor against the moral principles of the agent. These concepts are empirically understudied due to the difficulties of acquiring qualitative reliable data of corrupt agents. The research question that underlies this study is: How do corruption perpetrators rationalize corruption? We aim to empirically explain these mechanisms and understand how organizations can foster or prevent corruption rationalization. To achieve these goals, we conducted a content analysis of the testimony of 49 Odebrecht executives, a large Brazilian construction and energy company, who pled guilty to an international corruption scheme. These executives described and deconstructed the rationalization approach they used to commit the crimes over the years in plea bargains. This research summarized previous rationalization studies in eight categories to which we found empirical evidence. Moreover, executives in different hierarchical levels use different mechanisms, impacting organizational prevention and corruption combat.