No More than What I Post: Preventing Linkage Attacks on Check-in Services

Abstract

With the flourishing of location based social networks, posting check-ins has become a common practice to document one's daily life. Users usually do not consider check-in records as violations of their privacy. However, through analyzing two real-world check-in datasets, our study shows that check-in records are vulnerable to linkage attacks. To address this problem, we design a partition-and-group framework to integrate the information of check-ins and additional mobility data to attain a novel privacy criterion - kt, l-anonymity. It ensures adversaries with arbitrary background knowledge cannot use check-ins to re-identify users in other anonymous datasets or learning unreported mobility records. The proposed framework achieves favorable performance against state-of-art baseline in terms of improving check-in utility by 24% ~ 57% while providing stronger privacy guarantee at the same time. We believe this study will open a new angle in attaining both privacy-preserving and useful check-in services.