No match made in heaven. Parliamentary sovereignty, EU over-constitutionalization and Brexit

Abstract

ABSTRACTThe abundant literature on the UK’s Brexit-decision has focused on explaining the politicization and preference formation leading up to the referendum. But the institutional background has received much less attention. I argue that as a common-law country with a tradition of parliamentary sovereignty, the UK exhibits institutional features that pose a significant mismatch to the prevailing policymaking mode in the European Union. The latter relies heavily on the constitutionalization of the EU-Treaties with the four freedoms, competition law, and citizenship rights, and accords an extraordinary role to the European Court of Justice in policymaking. Constitutionalized European rules regarding freedom of movement and EU citizens’ access to the welfare state drove the politicization of EU-membership in the UK. To understand why ‘taking back control’ found such resonance, it is important to reflect the core features of the UK polity.