Abstract
AbstractDiscussions of the nonidentity problem presuppose a widely shared intuition that actions or policies that change who comes into existence do not, thereby, become morally unproblematic. We hypothesize that this intuition is not generally shared by the public, which could have widespread implications concerning how to generate support for large-scale, identity-affecting policies relating to matters like climate change. To test this, we ran a version of the well-known dictator game designed to mimic the public's behavior over identity-affecting choices. We found the public does seem to behave more selfishly when making identity-affecting choices, which should be concerning. We further hypothesized that one possible mechanism is the notion of harm the public uses in their decision making and find that substantial portions of the population seem to each employ distinct notions of harm in their normative thinking. These findings raise puzzling features about the public's normative thinking that call out for further empirical examination.
Highlights
If human life is to continue on this planet, we need to motivate the public to care more deeply about the welfare of people who don’t yet exist
A substantial proportion of the population seems largely indifferent about what kind of world we leave to those future people – a large enough proportion to perpetually erase any fleeting progress made on climate change mitigation
Subjects are divided on whether exceptionally low offers in the dictator game result in a harm to the recipient, a sizable portion of subjects thought that such low transfers do harm
Summary
If human life is to continue on this planet, we need to motivate the public to care more deeply about the welfare of people who don’t yet exist. The identityaffecting choices discussed in the literature seem just as wrong as the parallel choices that don’t change who comes into existence This intuition is so widespread among philosophers working on this problem that even those who think the intuition is mistaken admit to sharing it anyway (e.g., Boonin 2014). Our experience teaching the non-identity problem clashed with what is generally accepted: nonphilosophers often do see a substantial moral difference between identity-affecting cases and the parallel cases that don’t change who comes into existence. One possible explanation for this change is that many people might employ a version of what has been called the ‘counterfactual comparative account’ of harm in their normative thinking On this notion of harm, an agent cannot be harmed if she hasn’t been made worse off, and so the agents who are causally downstream in identity-affecting actions wouldn’t count as being harmed (since they wouldn’t have existed otherwise).
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
