Abstract

Performing costly helpful behaviours can allow individuals to improve their reputation. Those who gain a good reputation are often preferred as interaction partners and are consequently better able to access support through cooperative relationships with others. However, investing in prosocial displays can sometimes yield social costs: excessively generous individuals risk losing their good reputation, and even being vilified, ostracised or antisocially punished. As a consequence, people frequently try to downplay their prosocial actions or hide them from others. In this review, we explore when and why investments in prosocial behaviour are likely to yield social costs. We propose two key features of interactions that make it more likely that generous individuals will incur social costs when: (a) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; and (b) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them. We describe how the cognition required to consider ulterior motives emerges over development and how these tendencies vary across cultures - and discuss how the potential for helpful actions to result in social costs might place boundaries on prosocial behaviour as well as limiting the contexts in which it might occur. We end by outlining the key avenues and priorities for future research.

Highlights

  • Investing in costly cooperative behaviour can yield benefits Humans are outliers in the extent and frequency of our cooperation, when this occurs with non-relatives and in settings where the potential for direct reciprocal benefits is low (Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Melis & Semmann, 2010; Bshary & Raihani, 2017; Henrich, 2017; Henrich et al, 2005; Boyd, 2017)

  • Theoretical models have confirmed the evolutionary logic of reputation-based cooperation, via either indirect reciprocity (Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006) or reputation-based partner choice (Fu et al, 2008; Li, 2014; Roberts, 1998, 2015)

  • We propose that generosity is least likely to yield benefits and most likely to result in social costs in two, non-mutually exclusive scenarios: (1) observers infer that helpful behaviour is motivated by strategic or selfish motives; (2) observers infer that helpful behaviour is detrimental to them

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Summary

Introduction

Investing in costly cooperative behaviour can yield benefits Humans are outliers in the extent and frequency of our cooperation, when this occurs with non-relatives and in settings where the potential for direct reciprocal benefits is low (Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Melis & Semmann, 2010; Bshary & Raihani, 2017; Henrich, 2017; Henrich et al, 2005; Boyd, 2017). Helping behaviour may be under positive selection because these costly investments allow an actor to signal something about themselves to observers (Barker et al, 2019). Helpful acts can allow an individual to reveal their type (Gintis et al, 2001) or their intentions (McNamara & Barta, 2020; Roberts, 2020; Singh & Hoffman, 2021). Receivers can benefit from attending to such signals as this allows them to identify and preferentially assort with cooperative interaction partners (Barclay, 2016; Baumard et al, 2013; McNamara et al, 2008). Theoretical models have confirmed the evolutionary logic of reputation-based cooperation, via either indirect reciprocity (Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2006) or reputation-based partner choice (Fu et al, 2008; Li, 2014; Roberts, 1998, 2015).

But benefits do not always follow from prosocial actions
When and why might helpful signals yield social costs?
Observers infer strategic or selfish motives
Observers infer that helping behaviour is detrimental to them
Reputation management strategies in humans
The cognitive underpinnings of managing and evaluating reputations
Conclusions and future directions

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