No Ethics without Resistance

Abstract

In the posthumously published Conversations of Goethe with Eckermann and Soret, Goethe expresses no small degree of perplexity concerning a short passage in the tragedy of Antigone: There is a passage in Antigone which I always look upon as a blemish, and I would give a great deal for an apt philologist to prove that it is interpolated and spurious.1 Goethe's open-ended request is hardly compatible with the popular picture that people form of Anti- gone's motivations, namely that she acted solely out of a sense of duty and love for her brother because he belonged to the inner circle of the family. What then is this passage that so perplexed Goethe? the heroine has, in the course of the piece, explained the noble motives for her action, and displayed the elevated purity of her soul, she at last, when she is led to death, brings forward a motive which is quite unworthy, and almost borders upon the comic. At this point Goethe then paraphrases the Greek text (lines 902-12) in the following way: [Antigone] says that, if she had been a mother, she would not have done, either for her dead children or for her dead husband, what she has done for her brother. For, says she, 'if my husband died I could have had another, and if my children died I could have had others by my new husband. But with my brother, the case is different. I cannot have another brother; for since my mother and father are dead, there is no one to beget one.' After rewording the text in this way, Goethe then reiterates how crudely bare Antigone's declaration is and reiterates his demand: is, at least, the bare sense of the passage, which in my opinion, when placed in the mouth of a heroine going to her death, disturbs the tragic tone, and appears to me very far fetched-to savor too much of calculation. As I said, I should like a philologist to show us that the passage is spurious. In Goethe's estimation, what is so shocking here is that Antigone makes a dialectical calculation in the face of her death. It is by no means a utilitarian calculus, but rather a rational justifica- tion meant to clarify, here and now, what it is that makes Polynices irreplaceable for her. For Goethe, the justification spoils her purity as a tragic character and unintentionally casts her action in a disturbingly comic light.Antigone explains that she would not have made the same sacrifice for a hus- band that she made for her brother. A husband is replaceable-if you lose one, you can always find another one somewhere else. In other words, Antigone's maternal role does not depend on one particular man, for a different husband could give her a child if she were childless in her first marriage, or he could give her a second child if she were to lose the first. Antigone thereby reduces her husband to a pure and simple procreative function-he is like a variable in an equation that could easily be filled in by any old replacement. According to Goethe, Antigone would not even have carried out the same sacrifice for her own child. This is because, just like a husband, a child is not irreplaceable in the same way as Polynices is. Antigone's reasoning here brings to mind the cruel popular wisdom that having a new child is the best remedy for losing a first. But what is it that makes Polynices so unique for her? The motive for her action is not that he is a member of the family with whom she shared a direct blood relationship. It cannot be due to his direct blood tie to Antigone, for she would not have done what she did for just any family member, nor even for any brother. If she had had another living brother, or if her parents had still been alive and were capable of producing another one, she would have let his body rot in the desert. Was Polynices perhaps her favourite brother? No, this couldn't possibly be the case, for her particular affection for him was not in the game: if personal bonds had been her motive, then her behaviour would not have been influenced by the existence of another brother. …