Nishitani Keiji: Nihilism, Buddhism, Anontology

Abstract

Is there such a thing as a Buddhist philosophy, a specifically Japanese Buddhist philosophy? The question calls for a complex answer, involving a discussion of what is “Buddhist” and what is “philosophy.” If one were to answer “yes,” for the twentieth century, the Kyoto School of philosophy comes to mind. But for the most part, although the writings of the Kyoto School founder, NISHIDA Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870–1945), were replete with Buddhist inspired ideas, their Buddhist origins were not always made explicit until in his very last works. Nishida’s most famous disciple NISHITANI Keiji 西谷啓治 (1900–1990), on the other hand, never seemed to have any qualms about discussing certain elements in his thinking as Buddhist, in particular, Mahāyāna or Zen-inspired. Yet the issue is not a simple one and it would be reductive to identify Nishitani as nothing but a Buddhist thinker. He certainly was not sectarian or dogmatic in his use of Buddhist concepts, and he also proves himself to be a global thinker in his use of non-Buddhist, i.e., Christian or western ways of thinking. His major concern throughout his career was nihilism and modernity, and we see in his works the unfolding of a philosophical conversation between western philosophy, Christianity, and Buddhism in dealing with the issues of nihilism and modernity. In this essay, I begin with a short biographical introduction to Nishitani the philosopher. I then discuss his views on nihilism, and the various Mahāyāna Buddhist motifs he appropriates and employs in developing his own response to nihilism and the perennial questions of human existence. I also argue that his appropriation of Buddhist concepts in his response to nihilism leads him to what I call “anontology.”