Nils Ørvik's “Defence against Help”

Abstract

Four catchphrases encapsulate the history of Canadian policy since 1945. When accounting for Canada's involvement in military alliances and operations, scholars often borrow Lieutenant-General E.L.M Burns's image of Ottawa's aim to secure seat at the table, while R.B. Byers's description of the commitment-capability gap aptly depicts the tendency of Canada's ambitions to surpass the means allocated to the armed forces.1 In a similar vein, Joel J. Sokolsk/s quip that politicians ask much is just enough? when contemplating their military options is increasingly used to understand the Canadian government's attitude towards spending and multinational operations.2 In analyzing the Canada-United States relationship, meanwhile, the idea of defence against is regularly employed to shed light on Ottawa's approach to North American security.First coined in 1973 by the Norwegian-born scholar Nils 0rvik who taught for many years at Queen's University in Kingston, the phrase 'defence against help' arguably captures how successive Canadian governments have confronted the challenges associated with securing the North American landmass alongside the world's preeminent military power. References to 0IVi]^s concept have multiplied in the past decade as Ottawa has struggled to prove that Canada is a reliable continental security partner in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States. Recently, for instance, two scholars declared boldly that defence against explains the history of Canada-US security relations.3The appeal of 0RdJk^s concept among Canadian observers is unremarkable. Defence against neatly summarizes many of the continental security dilemmas that Canada has faced since the late 1930s. is noteworthy, however, is that 0rvik did not think that Canada followed a defence-against-help approach to continental security. Quite the contrary; when 0rvik wrote about Canada and against help, he was telling Canadian governments what they ought to do in matters of continental defence, not evaluating what they were already doing. Specifically, with respect to Canada, 0rvik was prescribing a strategy, not describing one.What is equally noteworthy, though, is that analysts who apply against help in a descriptive fashion rarely acknowledge the disconnect between their work and 0RdI^s. For the most part, references to 0rvik tend to ignore his perspective emphasis. This is not to suggest that the descriptive use of the idea is wrong or that a return to 0IYiI^s prescriptive argument is in order. Yet it does show that the prescriptive origins of a widely employed Canadian policy catchphrase have been ignored, or at least overlooked.The following discussion of 0RdJk^s defence-against-help strategy serves to remind readers of the prescriptive origins of this idea, while acknowledging the appeal of using the notion to describe Canada-US security relations. The article begins with a discussion of how 0rvik came to recommend a defenceagainst-help strategy for Canada. Next, the impact of 0TViIcZs prescriptions and the descriptive uses of his work are explored. The article concludes with a brief summary of 0IViIc1S intellectual legacy.IMPORTED HELPOrvik put forth his defence-against-help strategy as one solution to the following national security dilemma: What does a country do when it becomes obvious that its forces are unable to resist successfully an attack by the superior forces of a neighbouring state?4 According to contemporary theories, small states that found themselves in such a predicament could follow one of three strategies: they could either greatly increase their military strength (self-help); rely on the armed forces of another state for their (borrowed help); or maintain a purely symbolic military (helplessness). When he surveyed the behaviour of small powers, 0rvik found that many did adopt one of these options. …