NIH Response to Open Letter

Abstract

Although we appreciate hearing the views of some of our most respected scientists, the open letter from some of our colleagues in the microbiology community (“An open letter to Elias Zerhouni,” S. Altman et al. , Letters, 4 Mar., p. [1409][1]) does not provide a complete picture of funding for the biodefense and nonbiodefense research programs of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), particularly the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) ([1][2]). The letter argues that biodefense research efforts have diverted resources from nonbiodefense research at NIH. This is simply not the case. Funding for biodefense research has been additive to nonbiodefense research efforts supported by NIAID. The letter focuses only on support for research on the agents that cause tularemia, anthrax, plague, glanders, melioidosis, and brucellosis. NIAID biodefense funding is used to support research on a much broader list of more than 50 pathogens, which include “traditional” biodefense pathogens, such as those that cause anthrax and smallpox, as well as newly emerging infectious agents such as the SARS coronavirus and pathogens that cause diseases that affect people around the world on a daily basis ([2][3]). The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the dissemination of anthrax spores through the U.S. mail later that fall prompted the administration, with bipartisan support from Congress, to dramatically increase biodefense spending. Approximately $1.5 billion was added to the NIH budget in 2003 specifically to address concerns raised by bioterrorism, and this level of funding has been maintained with small to modest increases in subsequent years. (see [table][4]). These resources could have been allocated to other agencies that likely would not have embraced the academic microbiology and infectious diseases community, as is the tradition of NIH. View this table: Before the designation of “biodefense funding,” many pathogens with bioterror potential (e.g., the agents of anthrax and plague) were funded from a general pool of microbiology funds. With the establishment of the designation of biodefense money, studies of many pathogens previously funded from the general pool of microbiology money were funded by biodefense money, allowing additional grants for nonbiodefense pathogens. Also, in the period from 2000 to 2005, funding for NIAID nonbiodefense research increased by more than 50% and generally kept pace with the overall increases in NIH research funding for other diseases (see [table][4]). The accounting methodology used by the authors of the letter took into account only a fraction of the overall biodefense and nonbiodefense programs at NIH ([1][2]). In addition, the authors' analyses were based on searches of public databases that were not designed for comparative analyses of relative support for research areas. The authors' assertion that the peer-review process has been “threatened by unintended consequences of the 2001–2002 decision… to prioritize research of high biodefense, but low public-health significance” is unfounded. Indeed, in 2004, the success rates for NIAID biodefense and nonbiodefense research project grant applications were comparable at 25.9% (316 grants awarded) and 23.5% (845 grants awarded), respectively. More broadly, we disagree with the notion that biodefense concerns are of “low public-health significance.” The United States has experienced an anthrax attack, and security experts repeatedly express concern that future attacks with biological weapons are likely, if not inevitable. We look forward to continuing a dialogue with our colleagues in the microbiology community with regard to the biodefense and nonbiodefense research agenda of the NIH. 1. 1.[↵][5] National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, Open Letter in Science Regarding NIH Biodefense Funding: Questions and Answers (available at [www2.niaid.nih.gov/newsroom/Releases/scienceletter.htm][6]). 2. 2.[↵][7] The complete list can be viewed at [www.niaid.nih.gov/Biodefense/bandc_priority.htm][8]. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.307.5714.1409c [2]: #ref-1 [3]: #ref-2 [4]: #T1 [5]: #xref-ref-1-1 View reference 1. in text [6]: http://www2.niaid.nih.gov/newsroom/Releases/scienceletter.htm [7]: #xref-ref-2-1 View reference 2. in text [8]: http://www.niaid.nih.gov/Biodefense/bandc_priority.htm