Nigeria and the AfCFTA as a two‐level game

Abstract

AbstractThis paper makes the case for analysing the political economy of regional integration in Africa to help address the implementation gap that affects African economic integration. It builds on the “two‐level games” model of inter‐state negotiations developed by Putnam (International Organisation, 42, 1988, 427) and the “five lenses” approach to political economy analysis proposed by Byiers et al. (African Economic Brief, 6, 2015, 1). The paper then applies the approach to Nigeria's engagement with AfCFTA negotiations, and identifies potential constraints, challenges and opportunities in relation to the implementation of the AfCFTA by Nigeria. At the continental level, Nigeria's power and aspirations to continental leadership allowed and inspired it to play a prominent role in the AfCFTA negotiations. However, within‐country dynamics in Nigeria slowed the signing of the AfCFTA Agreement and the same may yet undermine its implementation. More broadly the Nigerian case study illustrates the kinds of actors and factors that will shape how other African states implement the AfCFTA. In this regard political economy analysis, and in particular, the methodological approach developed here, can help understand the interests, incentives and agency at play in domestic contexts.