Nietzsche’s Philosophical Anthropology

Abstract

We must begin our discussion here by inquiring briefly into the meaning of the term “philosophical anthropology.” Historically, philosophical anthropology has frequently been characterized as “metaphysical.” However, in our discussion we wish to use the term in such a way as to create a contrast between metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. In the preceding chapter we used “metaphysics” to designate the cosmological perspective — a perspective which TRANSCENDS the “practical” concerns of man’s life. Thus, by “philosophical anthropology,” we shall mean those perspectives which center around the Life-concerns of the human being. It can be argued, as we shall see, that there is a “metaphysical” dimension to philosophical anthropology. We shall accept this argument with qualification, for ultimately even the Transcendent cosmological perspective is a human perspective, although not an anthropological one in the sense in which we wish to use the term “anthropological” here. At this point, we once again encounter the problem which Heidegger raised previously. There is a sense in which it is tautological to say that all of the perspectives which man can adopt are perspectives of anthropos and are, therefore, “anthropological.” Heidegger attacks the notion of philosophical anthropology because, for him, anthropology is the highest, most radical, and therefore also the most nihilistic, form of “subjectivism.” However, even Heidegger admits the possibility of an analysis of anthropos, which is itself not anthropological. Heidegger calls this analysis “an existential analytic of human Dasein,” and argues that it is grounded in his “fundamental ontology.” Heidegger’s analysis of Nietzsche’s philosophy as the “consummation” of Western metaphysics precludes, as far as Heidegger is concerned, any possibility that Nietzsche has escaped “subjectivism” and thereby “overcomes” metaphysics. This is a pre-judgment which, for the purposes of our discussion here, we must be careful to avoid. We shall be concerned with inquiring into Nietzsche’s theory of man and investigating the nature of the dialectic which is operative between the perspectives of life and the cosmological perspective. This investigation will include a consideration of the question as to whether Nietzsche can escape the charge of “subjectivism.” In this way, it is hoped that we shall arrive at an understanding of the innermost workings of Nietzsche’s philosophy. There are already in existence several good expositions of various facets of Nietzsche’s philosophical anthropology. We shall try to avoid duplication by thinking through Nietzsche’s position in terms of the fundamental dualism which we are in the process of elucidating. However, a certain amount of repetition is unavoidable. Our primary purpose here is not simply to exposit Nietzsche, but rather to attempt a re-thinking of his philosophical anthropology from a new direction.