Nietzsche's Theory of Truth and Belief

Abstract

The thesis of this paper is that, on the whole, Nietzsche operated with two theories of truth, a correspondence and a pragmatic theory, the pragmatic theory of being derivative from a more fundamental pragmatic theory of belief. A version of the correspondence theory is presupposed in Nietzsche's claim that his conception of the world as a matrix of forces and powers is a true account of how the world really is. It is also presupposed in his claim that our quite ordinary beliefs that there are enduring things, objects or bits of matter or material is an illusion or i.e., these ordinary beliefs are false. Since the world is just a matrix of forces and powers there can be no such items. However Nietzsche alleges that since we are creatures that have evolved with certain sensory organs and intellectual capacities that enable us to form beliefs, then there must have been some life-preserving utility in having beliefs that such items exist (despite the alleged falsity of such beliefs). Beliefs in such items, Nietzsche claims, can have pragmatic value but they are no guide to how the world really is. Since most pragmatists do not openly admit that pragmatically held beliefs are false, Nietzsche is not so much a pragmatist about as a pragmatist about belief. Nietzsche does not normally tell us which theory of he is using when he employs words such as true, (and their cognates) or such words as error, and illusion. In particular, he talks of in the context of his pragmatic theory of and/or belief when these truths are often regarded by him as false claims (in the correspondence sense of the theory of truth). This can lead to much ambiguity and paradox. Consider the remark: Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive (WP ?493).' The first word truth occurs with reference to the pragmatic theory and means something like those beliefs we normally