Nietzsche's Notion of Lying

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article clarifies Nietzsche's notion of lying. The notion needs clarification because it is at odds with widespread definitions of lying. The first section compares Nietzsche's notion of lying in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) 192 with a widespread definition of lying, highlighting the former's oddity. The second section argues that “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” (TL) helps to clarify Nietzsche's notion of lying as he wants to allow for unconscious lies—an expression that can be found only in TL. The third section explains Nietzsche's notion of lying as a form of intellectual dishonesty that involves making something seem real that is not. The fourth section applies the notion of lying to make sense of BGE 192 and answer additional questions. The fifth section ends the article by bringing to bear Nietzsche's notion of lying on passages on lying by Nietzsche in his late work The Antichrist. The last section thus makes a case for Nietzsche's sticking to this notion throughout his writing. The present study aims at rehabilitating TL in certain respects by highlighting the explanatory potential of Nietzsche's notion of lying as laid out there.