Nietzsche's Genealogical Critique

Abstract

most valuable insights are discovered last, Nietzsche tells us in The Antichrist, most valuable insights are methods (A 13).1 Nietzsche's genealogical method is undeniably a late insight,2 but what of its value? He certainly believes that genealogy is critical, and that its philosophical value lies in its critical force, in its ability to evaluate beliefs, practices, and forms of life. However, if genealogy is not critical, as some leading commentators maintain, its value is significantly diminished, for it becomes a method merely to describe psychological, normative, and practical subtleties of our historical existence. In this essay I argue that Nietzsche's genealogy is in fact genuinely critical, and that its considerable value as a philosophical method lies in radicality of its critical force. The essay is divided into three main parts, and in first part I consider Richard Schacht's case against genealogical critique and derive from weaknesses of his position four criteria which any compelling account of Nietzsche's genealogical critique must satisfy. In second part, in anticipation of satisfying these criteria, I elucidate critical force of genealogy by distinguishing three dimensions of genealogical critique that are all oriented toward a symptomatology. Finally, in third part I argue that while several commentators such as Sarah Kofman and Alexander Nehamas rightly hold that genealogy is critical, they neglect one or more of these criteria. More specifically, they fail to explain convincingly problematic relationship between genealogical critique and perspectivism. I argue that key to satisfying criteria in question, and to reconciling genealogy with perspectivism, lies in recognizing that Nietzsche's genealogical critique moves good and evil to symptomatology. Nietzsche's genealogical critique moves beyond truth and falsity of moral principles to diagnosis of morality as pathological, as symptomatic of latent pathologies and degenerate forms of life, and radicality of its critical force lies precisely in this movement. Schacht on Genealogy In most general terms, there are two views about Nietzsche's genealogy and critique; one view holds that genealogy is critical, while other view holds that genealogy is not critical. Significantly different versions of former view are provided by Eric Blonde],3 David Couzens Hoy,4 Sarah Kofman,5 Alexander Nehamas,6 and Mark Warren.7 Different versions of latter view, which vary much less widely than those of first, are provided by Daniel Conway8 and Richard Schacht.9 Before elaborating and defending my own account of Nietzsche's genealogical critique, I want to begin by considering most prominent case against genealogical critique, that made by Richard Schacht. Schacht takes subtitle of The Will to Power seriously; he maintains that Nietzsche's mature philosophical project is the revaluation of all values, and that all his late genealogical works are directed at different dimensions of this revaluation. Schacht then distinguishes three methodological stages in Nietzsche's revaluation: a genealogy of a critique of and overcoming of values. First, genealogy is an historical and psychological method that simply investigates and describes origins and development of Western values. But, Schacht claims, the revaluation of values only begins, and does not end, with inquiry into their genealogy.10 So secondly, on basis of genealogical evidence of historical origins and development of Western those values are subject to critique according to two standards. Genealogy reveals presuppositions about character of human nature on which values are based, and critique of values calls into question tenability of those presuppositions. Beyond presuppositional critique, Nietzsche is said to invoke value of values for life as a further standard for critique of values. …