Nietzsche and the Circle of Nothing

Abstract

In section 55 of The Will to Power, written on June 10, 1887, Friedrich Nietzsche pens a thought, a terrible and distressing thought, terrible for what it proclaims, distressing for human who is asked to entertain this thought, thought of of its eternal Let us think this thought in its most terrible form: existence (das Dasein) as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness: the eternal recurrence. This is most extreme form of nihilism: (das Nichts) (the [das 'Sinnlose']), eternally!1 Nothing shall be our topic, topos from which we intend to set out in this essay. Certainly, thought of nothing seems to invite rather thought of a certain atopos, a noplace, inviting a strange and uncanny thought into world. Supposing this thought would assail man as a disturbing emptiness, as an unheard of silence, as an incalculable, unruly dissolution of meaning, it would no doubt defy prescribed usage of metaphysical-moral discourses in given contexts, interrupting, if not corrupting, constituted normality. To be sure, this does not mean, conversely, that thought of nothing is a thought of indeterminate, or, as Hegel has it, of indeterminate immediacy. If we cannot yet say what sort of thought it is, we can at least infer from Nietzsche's passage that it is neither immediate to thought or intuition nor conceptually indeterminate. Doubtless, this passage, together with what Nietzsche says elsewhere, poses a perplexing problem. He seems to be saying, on one hand, that recurrence of a meaningless and aimless existence, of nothing, animates economy of nihilism. But, on other hand, other texts in Nietzsche's corpus would lead us to suppose that with or in thought of eternal return nihilism finds itself overturned, abolished. Does return, in other words, underscore life of nihilist-skeptic, destroyer of all beliefs, or life of overman, creator and self-creator? To say that return animates both lives would not get us very much further in disentangling this confusing and confounding knot. So let us start with a simple question. is nihilism? does it mean? This seems easy to say. Nietzsche provides us with a succinct definition of nihilism in section 2 of The Will to Power: does nihilism mean (Was bedeutet Nihilismus)! That highest values devaluate themselves. The aim is lacking; why? finds no answer. (WP 9, WM 10) And yet, isn't it strangely paradoxical for Nietzsche to give us a definition of nihilism, for telling us what it means? We say: What is-nihilism? is-its meaning? Ti estin: form of question betrays an ancient prejudice, as Heidegger would be quick to remind us, since by asking for a definition of nihilism, we are in effect asking for its essence, its ground, its meaning. But isn't nihilism very thought which puts an end to metaphysical and moral foundationalism and essentialism, thought of utter meaninglessness? Presumably so. And yet nihilism has a meaning: eternal recurrence of of meaningless.-Unless nihilism is that thought which compels us to think impossibility of ever putting an end to meaning, a thought, in other words, which calls upon us to think impossibility of nihilism, that even as we think devaluation of highest values, reduction of all meanings to nil, we cannot think this thought unless we think meaning that attaches to nihilism, we cannot have done with meaning and value if we are still thinking of nihilism. There is no doubt something strangely circular to this thought, but we cannot yet be sure whether this is what Nietzsche wants us to think as nihilism, as uncanny circle of nihilism. The following essay claims to be an interpretation of first passage above. Our aim is to bring home intriguing connection Nietzsche establishes between nihilism and eternal return, a connection that has scarcely been commented on in Nietzsche literature. …