Nicolai Hartmann and the Transcendental Method

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One of the most often explored, repeatedly interpreted, and recognized again and again as a valuable achievement of Kant’s philosophy, is his transcendental philosophy, a new methodological approach that – as Kant believed – will allow philosophy (metaphysics) to enter upon a secure path of science. In this paper, I explore Nicolai Hartmann’s reinterpretation and development of this methodology in both the historical and systematic context of his thought. First, I will deal with the Neo-Kantian’s understanding of the transcendental method as a starting point of Hartmann’s own understanding of it. Then I will analyze in detail his only paper devoted entirely to the problem of the method, (Hartmann, 1912), to present how he understands the necessary development of this methodology. I will claim that despite the fact that Hartmann – following Kant – never denied that the real essence of philosophy is the transcendental method, he tried to show that this methodus philosophandi cannot be reduced to the Neo-Kantian’s understanding of it. He argued that the core of all true philosophical and scientific research is the transcendental method, but only insofar as it is accompanied by two other methods that are needed to complete it: descriptive and dialectical method. I will close by presenting the relations between these three methods.