Abstract
This study examines the effects of Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) news announcements on a non-accelerated filer's levels of information asymmetry proxied by bid–ask spread. We find that, on average, the information asymmetry decreases (increases) after the announcements of compliance (deferral of compliance) with Section 404 of SOX. While a deferral announcement delays incurring the cost of compliance with Section 404, it signals lack of disclosure of relevant price sensitive information about the effectiveness of internal control systems, leading to higher levels of information asymmetry. Consistently, we find that, on average, prices increase (decrease) in response to the announcements signaling compliance (deferral of compliance) with Section 404 of SOX. Additionally, the results from cross-sectional analyses of abnormal returns indicate that changes in information asymmetry are priced by investors, whereas firm-specific estimates of cost of compliance with Section 404 do not appear to play a significant role in securities.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
