Newman's Dispute with Locke

Abstract

THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO DISPUTES between Newman and Ix)eke in the Grammar ol Assent. The first is on the question of whether or not there are degrees of assent. Locke thinks that there are and Newman thinks that there axe not. In the second dispute, Newman contests Locke's pretentious axiom that probable reasoning can never lead to certitude. 'u This seems to me to be by fax the more important issue, and I shall concentrate on it after having made some remarks about the first. According to Locke, the mind judges or assents whenever it . . . any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs. ''2 The difference between judgment and assent, for Locke, is that a judgment takes place subsequent to the direct investigation of facts, whereas an assent is given to the conclusion of verbal reasoning, when that reasoning does not entail the conclusion, s Both assents and judgments are takings or presumings that P is the ease. 4 This being so, assent is a mental act, and does not admit of degrees. Hence it is (at least) misleading of Locke to speak of degrees of assent. 5 Locke introduces that notion because he believes that there is something that we should vary in our acceptance of P according as the evidence for P is strong or weak. Now we cannot vary our assent, as Locke defines that, but we can vary our assurance. And in fact Locke says