Abstract
In the aftermath of the banking crisis in South‐East Asia, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recommended that the South‐East Asian economies adopt several aspects of the New Zealand approach to bank supervision. The New Zealand approach relies heavily upon market incentives. This paper analyses three key aspects of the New Zealand supervisory regime: the removal of deposit insurance; the public disclosure regime; and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand's supervisory responsibilities. In this paper, we argue that this supervisory regime is built on weak foundations, and therefore, it should not be emulated by other economies.
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