New strategy, new accountability? The European Central Bank and the European Parliament after the strategy review

Abstract

A striking asymmetry defines the European Central Bank (ECB)’s approach to democratic accountability. Although the post-2008 era saw the ECB move dramatically beyond the narrow role envisaged for it by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the central bank has continued to hew closely to its scarce accountability provisions.This article documents the much more complex and discretionary nature of today’s ECB policymaking by comparing the frameworks informing Governing Council deliberations according to the 1998, 2003 and 2021 strategies. It shows that the transformation of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy has not been matched with enhanced accountability arrangements between the ECB and the European Parliament. The article concludes with ambitious, but concrete policy proposals – both in substance and form – for new ways of informing the public about monetary policy, instruments to improve accountability and coordinating monetary policy with other European policymakers. European Central Bank, democratic accountability, European Parliament, new strategy, interinstitutional coordination