New Resource on Organizational and Policy Ethics in Hospice

Abstract

Starting with a basic necessity of definition (what exactly do we mean when we talk about suffering?), DeGrazia pins down concepts to either the more broad (e.g., suffering is a disagreeable overall feeling) or the narrow (e.g., suffering is a negative emotional experience associated with significant pain or distress). Moving forward with this working narrow concept of suffering, he assimilates neurocognitive and philosophical constructs to propose that suffering may not be unique to humans. The conclusion certainly has relevance to animal research bioethics. But more pertinent to the bedside, this stream of thought might stretch our own preconceived notions of human suffering, giving us new bioethical perspectives to accept or reject. In their introduction, Green and Palpant underline a hope that Suffering and Bioethics ‘‘will inform the field of bioethics in policymaking and practice.’’ But they would be more accurate to include a broader audience. Any reader seeking to scrutinize the nature of human suffering will find something relevant here. As clinical attention to pain and symptommanagement anddebate around the roles and limits ofmedical technology finally find their way into the limelightofmodernmedicine, the time is right to push the problem of suffering to the center of bioethics work and debate. Suffering and Bioethics marks a commendable step toward this end.