Abstract
Establishing Dispositionalism as a viable theory of modality requires the successful fulfilment of two tasks: (i) showing that all modal truths can be derived from truths about actual powers, and (ii) offering a suitable metaphysics of powers. These two tasks are intertwined: difficulties in one can affect the chances of success in the other. In this paper, I generalise an objection to Dispositionalism by Jessica Leech and argue that the theory in its present form is ill-suited to account for de re truths about merely possible entities. I argue that such difficulty is rooted in a problem in the metaphysics of powers. In particular, I contend that the well-known tension between two key principle of powers ontology, namely Directedness (all powers are “for” their manifestation) and Independence (some powers might fail to bring about their manifestation) has received an unsatisfactory solution so far, and that it is this unsatisfactory solution concerning the status of “unmanifested manifestations” that makes it hard for Dispositionalism to account for mere possibilia. I develop a novel account of the status of unmanifested manifestations and an overall metaphysics of powers which allows to better respond to Leech's objection and handle mere possibilia. The central idea of the proposal is that unmanifested manifestations are akin to mere logical existents, and are best characterised as non-essentially non-located entities.
Highlights
Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which the truth of alethic modal claims is grounded in the irreducibly dispositional properties of actual entities
The goal of this paper is to offer a metaphysics of powers that is better suited for Dispositionalism than those currently on the market
Dispositionalism is still in its early days: there is much work to be done to show that the grounding task can be completed satisfactorily and the theory can achieve both extensional correctness and formal adequacy
Summary
Dispositionalism is the theory of modality according to which the truth of alethic modal claims is grounded in the irreducibly dispositional properties of actual entities. 2) “modal” phenomenon (powers), and to explain all the other alethic modal truths (or facts) upon it Firstly, it has to spell out how, exactly, powers can ground all modal talk. It has to spell out how, exactly, powers can ground all modal talk Such account needs to be, minimally, both formally adequate and extensionally correct In order to avoid ambiguities and confusions, and because it is not obvious that every account of powers is well-suited for the dispositionalist project, it is important to clarify the metaphysics of powers I consider objections concerning my use of a primitive essence operator in sketching the new metaphysics of powers
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