New Plant Breeding Techniques Under Food Security Pressure and Lobbying.

Qianqian Shao,Maarten Punt,Justus Wesseler

doi:10.3389/fpls.2018.01324

Abstract

Different countries have different regulations for the approval and cultivation of crops developed by using new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) such as gene editing. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between global food security and the level of NPBT regulation assuming a World Nation Official (WNO) proposes advice on global NPBT food policies. We show that a stricter NPBT food regulation reduces food security as measured by food availability, access, and utilization. We also find that political rivalry among interest groups worsens the food security status, given the NPBT food technology is more productive and the regulatory policy is influenced by lobbying. When the WNO aims to improve food security and weighs the NPBT food lobby contribution more than the non-NPBT food lobby's in the lobbying game, the total lobbying contributions will be the same for the WNO, and the NPBT food lobby will be more successful in the political process. The NPBT food lobby, however, under food security loses its advantage in the political competition, and this may result in a strict NPBT food policy. Under food security problems implementing stricter NPBT food regulations results in welfare losses. JEL Code: D04, D43, D72, P16

Highlights

After the 2008 food crisis, the potential fragility of the global food system returned as a major topic in the debate on global food security
This paper develops a standard political economy model of new plant breeding technologies (NPBTs) regulations, modeling the NPBT food policy as the outcome of a NPBT and non-NPBT food group lobbying game
We find that a stricter NPBT food policy has negative effects on three aspects of food security: availability, access, and utilization

Summary

INTRODUCTION

After the 2008 food crisis, the potential fragility of the global food system returned as a major topic in the debate on global food security. Cα (θ ) and Cβ (θ ) are the differentiable truthful contribution schedules of the two lobbying groups like in Grossman and Helpman (1994), which means the NPBT food policy effects on the groups’ contribution always represent the lobbies’ policy preferences We determine that Lemma 2 When the food security status is an important part of a WNO policy, the NPBT food group will be more efficient in the political game, but the WNO will not be worse off because it has the same total contribution income. The WNO could weight the non-NPBT food lobby heavier than the NPBT food lobby without decreasing its payoff

DISCUSSION

CONCLUSION