Abstract

A model Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (APUNCAC) would implement international requirements to report the beneficial ownership of funds involved in certain financial transactions. The purpose is to discourage the laundering of illicit funds by attaching legal consequences to each failure to obtain and submit a required report of beneficial ownership, and each failure by a front man who poses as a beneficial owner to supply true information regarding the identity of the actual beneficial owner. This article is the fifth in a series of articles describing APUNCAC’s anti-money-laundering (AML) provisions and focus on beneficial owner transparency. The companion articles focus on issues regarding international jurisdiction and enforcement of APUNCAC regarding distant offshore personnel, illustrate the application of APUNCAC to specific money laundering channels, answer frequently asked questions (FAQ), and translate APUNCAC’s key provisions into proposed Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations. This article explains how APUNCAC’s key provisions may be translated into Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) recommendations, why the OSCE may be especially inclined to adopt the recommendations, and why support of this initiative might be the most promising path that could be adopted by the international community to combat corruption, money laundering, and the violations of human rights that are associated with these crimes.

Highlights

  • According to documents obtained by the International Consortium of InvestigativeJournalists (ICIJ), trillions in tainted dollars flow freely through major banks, swamping a broken enforcement system (ICIJ 2020)

  • A model Anticorruption Protocol to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (APUNCAC) would implement international requirements to report the beneficial ownership of funds involved in certain financial transactions

  • The purpose is to discourage the laundering of illicit funds by attaching legal consequences to each failure to obtain and submit a required report of beneficial ownership, and to each failure by a front man who poses as a beneficial owner to supply true information regarding the identity of the actual beneficial owner

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Summary

Introduction

According to documents obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative. Journalists (ICIJ), trillions in tainted dollars flow freely through major banks, swamping a broken enforcement system (ICIJ 2020). APUNCAC’s AML provisions, they are not strongly aligned with provisions that seek to implement RICO, the False Claims Act, a model campaign finance law, New York’s conflict of interest rules and regulations, anticorruption inspectors, and dedicated anticorruption courts. This suggests a need to pursue an alternative path, perhaps in parallel with efforts to persuade the FATF to adopt the 19 recommendations.

APUNCAC
Mission
The 2012 Dublin Decision
The 2014 Basel Decision
The 2016 Hamburg Decision
New OSCE Recommendation 1—Beneficial Owner Reporting Rule
New OSCE Recommendation 2—FINCEN Database
New OSCE Recommendation 4—Penalties
New OSCE Recommendation 5—Dedicated Courts
New OSCE Recommendation 6—UN Inspectors
New OSCE Recommendation 7—Obstruction of Justice
New OSCE Recommendation 9—RICO
4.10. New OSCE Recommendation 10—Conflicts of Interest
4.14. New OSCE Recommendation 14—Transfer Pricing
4.16. New OSCE Recommendation 16—False Claims
4.17. New OSCE Recommendation 17—Campaign Reform
4.18. New OSCE Recommendation 18—Conspiracy
4.19. New OSCE Recommendation 19—Definitions
4.20. Summary
OSCE’s Role
A Potential Barrier
A Potential Solution
Findings
Conclusions
Full Text
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