Abstract
The problem of unconceived alternatives can be undermined, regardless of whether the possibility space of alternatives is bounded or unbounded. If it is bounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet eliminated enough false alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already eliminated enough false alternatives. If it is unbounded, pessimists need to justify their assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the possibility space of false alternatives to the possibility space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space.Keywords: changing spaces, Humean skepticism, scientific pessimism, scientific realism.
Highlights
IntroductionP. Kyle Stanford (2006) has developed an intriguing problem, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA)
On the other hand, the possibility space is unbounded, pessimists need to justify the assumption that the probability that scientists have not yet moved from the space of false alternatives to the space of true alternatives is higher than the probability that scientists have already moved from the former to the latter space
It appears that pessimists can believe that current theories are successful, but not that they are true. That this suggestion involves a double standard. Why is it that scientists can move from the possibility space of unsuccessful alternatives to the possibility space of successful alternatives, but not from the possibility space of false alternatives to the possibility space of true alternatives? It would beg the question for pessimists to appeal to the pessimistic induction or to the problem of underdetermination to justify this suggestion, for these antirealist ideas are the constituents of the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA) and the PUA is the subject of the present dispute
Summary
P. Kyle Stanford (2006) has developed an intriguing problem, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA). Kyle Stanford (2006) has developed an intriguing problem, the problem of unconceived alternatives (PUA) It asserts, roughly, that since scientists in the past could not conceive of the alternatives that ousted their accepted theories, current scientists cannot conceive of the alternatives that will oust currently accepted theories.
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