New Interpretation on Zhu Xi’s Remark of Mingde

Abstract

朱子對 《大學》 ｢明德｣的注解引發了當時及後代儒者許多的討論, 究竟明德是指心 或是指性而言？在朱子的有關文獻中都可以找出根據｡ 當代牟宗三先生認為依朱子, 明德是指性而言, 對此他做了非常嚴謹明白的分疏, 又對朱子的注文給出修訂｡ 筆者細 探｢明德注｣與 《大學或問》、《朱子語類》、《文集》 的有關的文獻, 認為明德是以心為主, 而性理在心中呈現之意｡ 明德不能只就心或理(性) 來理解, 而是兩者關聯在一起, 此說 應該是朱子詮釋明德的原意｡ 本論文準備證成此一對明德的理解, 並由此說明朱子在｢ 明德注｣中所說的｢因其所發而遂明之｣是表示理在心中隨時有其流露, 故人對於道德之 理是本有所知的｡ 本著此對性理的本知或已知, 就可以進一步而求真知, 故朱子可以說 ｢因其已知之理而益窮之｣, 而所謂｢一旦豁然貫通｣, 便有理論上的根據, 而非｢異質的跳 躍｣｡ 如此解釋, 應可以對朱子的成德理論給出一個較為順當的說明｡Zhu Xi’s remark on Mingde (明德) in Great Learning has been concerned and discussed by the Confucians. The issue is that what does Mingde refer to, Xin(心) or Xing(性)? The interpretative reasonableness of each definition of Mingde can be found in Zhu Xi’s Texts. According to the contemporary Confucian, Mr. Mou Zhongsan’s interpretation based on both of his philosophical argument and plenty of Zhu Xi’s texts, Mingde refers to Xing. Furthermore, Mr. Mou revised Zhu Xi’s remark on Mingde. After I investigated the related texts to Mingde among Daxue huo-wen (大學 或問), Zhu zi yu lei(朱子語類), and Zhuzi wenji(朱子文集), my interpretation should be as: when Zhu Xi uses the term, Mingde, the prospect that he emphasizes refers to Xin, and sees Li as the standard of moral judgment remaining within the Xin. Therefore, the meaning of Mingde implies Xin and Xing, and the relation, in the functioning meaning, between Xin and Xing is inseparable. My interpretation of Mingde is supposed to be coherent to Zhu Xi’s understanding of the relation between Xin and Xing, when he discusses Mingde. This Essay attempts to justify this interpretation of Mingde of Zhu Xi’s moral philosophy. Based on this interpretation, Zhu’s terminology, to be devoted to practice the moral judgment when it appears [yin qi suo fa er sui mingzhi; 因其所發而遂明之], means that Li which remains within Xing spontaneously functions. In this sense, one’s ordinary rational understanding of morality is not acquired from the experience. And one of the purposes of Zhu’s practical theory is to elevate one’s “ordinary rational understanding of morality”toward “philosophical rational understanding of morality” (chen-chih;真知). Zhu’s terminology, huoran guantong (豁然貫通), whose meaning is not “radical transformation [yizhi tiaoyue;異質跳躍]” has theoretical basis. I believe that this should be a reasonable and appropriate explanation of Zhu Xi’s moral theory.