New International Law: Silence, Defence or Deliverance?

Abstract

The meaning of international law is conveyed in the act of interpretation. The meaning consists of both the semantic content and the significance of the applied norms in an actual situation. This is because international law is not a physical fact, not a thing, but a human phenomenon. Even sceptics have to yield to some sort of understanding of meaning if they try to articulate their scepticism. In human phenomena the two the meaning-content and the meaning as significance have to be considered together. Every legal claim in the international environment has a significance and a semantic meaning which depend on each other. Both are present in the making and in the perception of a claim. They are the two sides of the same coin. The semantic meaning and the significance of international law become known only through an act of interpretation. This is the actuality character of international law. Norms complete with meaning and significance do not exist a priori as independent objects which could be picked up by whomever, whenever. They come into existence in a network of actual factors. The practitioner of international law knows this from experience. There is no book or store where he could find universally applicable norms and put them to use as they are. That is why he has to keep on struggling with those hard cases, no matter how many of them he already has on the record. Time after time he has to choose and compromise anew, taking into account the circumstances, possible consequences of his interpretation and semantic possibilities. In fitting together norms and particular circumstances, the practitioner cannot separate the meaning-content and the significance. The significance is reflected in the search for the right meaning-content. The mind