New evidence on what happens to CEOs after they retire

Abstract

I analyze directorships held by CEOs who retired during the periods 1989–1993, 1995–1999 (before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act) and 2001–2005 (after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act). My results suggest that retired CEOs became less popular on boards after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. In addition, although pre-retirement accounting performance helps explain the number of outside directorships a retired CEO held in the 1989–1993 sample, as Brickley et al. (1999) have found, it does not explain this number for the 1995–1999 sample and 2001–2005 sample. Third, a company's stock performance during a CEO's tenure is negatively related to the number of outside directorships only in the 2001–2005 sample. Fourth, the number of outside directorships is positively correlated with the size of a retired CEO's original firm before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, but this is not the case after the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Finally, if retired CEOs worked in regulated industries, their probability of serving at least one outside directorship 2 years after retirement falls by 21% in the 1989–1993 sample. However, this negative effect is marginally significant in the 1995–1999 sample, and vanishes in the 2001–2005 sample.