New Directions in Understanding Military and Civilian Regimes in Ghana

Abstract

A recurrent theme in most recent studies of the military regimes in developing countries has been that similarities rather than differences in performance constitute the main feature of comparison between civilian and military regimes (McKinlay and Cohan, 1975, 1976; Jackman, 1976). This paper will examine this theme in the Ghanaian context where civilian and military regimes have frequently alternated. Contrary to many current theories, it suggests that differences do occur between civilian and military regimes in the same country. Differences between civilian and military regimes become more apparent if one looks at the policy goals articulated by the different Ghanaian regimes instead of comparing the performance results of these same regimes. Simply stated, the major hypothesis of this paper is that the articulated policies and goals of a civilian government in a developing nation will differ economically, socially, politically and in terms of leadership style from the articulated goals of a military government in the same country. Furthermore, clarification of these articulated differences is important for the understanding of how different regimes perceive themselves and approach the process of governing. Recent literature has overlooked regime differences because of the similarity in the performance results of both civilian and military regimes. This paper suggests that regime differences do affect policy decisions and that as regimes get stronger they may again begin to affect performance results as well. Ghana appeared to be a good testing ground for showing differences between military and civilian regimes because it had experienced two civilian and two military regimes between 1957 and 1975. At the same time, many conditions and variables remained constant. The basic evidence for determining differences between military and civilian regimes comes from an examination of what regimes say in their government controlled newspaper editorials. This paper maintains that regimes often say what they mean, at least indirectly if not directly. The approach will be first to analyze what the different regimes in Ghana have said and then to look at past events for verification as to whether or not editorial statements were implemented by concrete actions. An implemented policy does not have to be successful. It only has to show that some movement occurred toward the development of a policy. For example, the second military government in Ghana started an agricultural program called Operation Feed Yourself. It was a new and implemented policy which