New Directions in Behavioral Game Theory: Introduction to the Special Issue

Russell Golman

doi:10.3390/g11040050

Abstract

Behavioral game theory accounts for how people actually make strategic decisions by incorporating social utility, limited iterated reasoning, and learning [...]

Highlights

Seier [2] in this Special Issue explores whether fairness in strategic games tends to be driven by intuitive or deliberative responses
Using two-player guessing games in which strategic choices map cleanly onto levels of reasoning in a level-k model [5,6,7], Zhao [4] finds that players engage in more steps of reasoning when their opponents have been placed under a condition of lighter cognitive load, and this effect is stronger when players themselves are under lighter cognitive load, and able to engage in more steps of reasoning in the first place
Other models, including logit quantal response equilibrium [8,9], noisy introspection [10], and the dual accumulator model [11], can account for limited iterated reasoning in guessing games, and manipulating the precision of logit responses in these models can affect the depth of reasoning that an individual exhibits

Summary

Introduction

Seier [2] in this Special Issue explores whether fairness in strategic games tends to be driven by intuitive or deliberative responses. The observed pattern of behavior reflects an adaptive response that transcends the level-k reasoning model.

Results

Conclusion